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ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, TITLE III,
AND THE REQUIREMENT OF NECESSITY
By Daniel F. Cook*
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
19681 was enacted to remedy what was considered an intolerable state
of the law in the area of electronic surveillance. 2 Title HI specifically
set out to accomplish the dual purpose of protecting the privacy of wire
and oral communications3 and of delineating on a national basis the cir-
cumstances and conditions under which the interception4 of wire and
oral communications may be authorized.5 The passage of Title I
marked an important milestone in the controversy6 over the constitu-
* Member, second year class.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Title HI].
2. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPoRT]. This report is also set out in full in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2112 (1968). "Electronic surveillance" as used in this note will refer to both wiretap-
ping and electronic eavesdropping (commonly referred to as "bugging") without the con-
sent of any party to the communication. Title m applies to both wiretapping and "bug-
ging." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) & (2) (1970).
3. "[Oiral communication means any oral communication uttered by a person ex-
hibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under cir-
cumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1968). For circum-
stances justifying such expectation, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
"Wire communication" is any communication made through communication facilities
making the transmission by wire, cable, or similar connection between point of origin
and of reception, and furnished by a common carrier of interstate or foreign communi-
cations. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1968).
4. "Interception" is defined as the "aural acquisition of the contents of any wire
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1968).
5. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 66.
6. See, Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 62 (1972) (Douglas, J., con-
curring); Cox v. United States, 406 U.S. 934 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353-54 (1966) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 317 (1966) (Warren, CJ., dissent-
ing); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring in
the result); Id. at 463-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747, 758 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 765 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928); id. at 471-78 (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); E.
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tionality7 and propriety of permissive electronic surveillance: it was the
first time Congress had ever authorized the use of electronic surveil-
lance under any circumstances.
One key limiting provision of Title III, intended to prevent unwar-
ranted invasions of personal privacy, mandates that the application for
an interception order contain:
[A] full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
gative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reason-
ably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous.8
A judge9 may authorize an order permitting electronic surveillance only
if it is found that:
[N]ormal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous.' 0
These two related requirements, which will be referred to as the
"necessity requirement," are not further mentioned elsewhere within
Title III, nor does Title Im provide guidelines for the interpretation of
LAPmus, EAVESDROPPING ON TRI (1974); Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic
Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 657 (1968); Schwartz, The Legitima-
tion of Electronic Eavesdropping: Tze Politics of "Law and Order." 67 MIcH. L. REV.
455 (1969); Symposium, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: Reflections on The
Eavesdroppers, 44 MiNN. L. REv. 811 (1960) (presenting five different viewpoints-the
legislator, prosecutor, defense counsel, private investigator, and law professor).
7. The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of the constitutionality of Title
JII, though the most recent cases involving Title III to be before the Court implicitly
accept its constitutionality. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). All of the federal courts of appeals that have
considered the issue have found Title I constitutional. E.g., United States v. Ramsey,
503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 639 (1974); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Gray v.
United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 73-231); United States v.
Whitaker, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); United States
v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972). All
of the federal district courts that have considered the issue of the constitutionality
of Title III have found it constitutional, with one exception. United States v. Whitaker,
343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 953 (1973).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1968).
9. The application must be approved by a United States district court judge or
United States court of appeals judge, not a United States magistrate. 18 U.S.C. §
2510(9) (1968). In the case of state applications the state statute must specify what
types of judges may issue interception orders.
10. Id. § 2518(3)(c) (1968).
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the requirement, how it is to be implemented, or what considerations
or criteria should be evaluated in the making of the judicial determina-
tion of necessity." The Senate Report accompanying Title I12 also
fails to elucidate the congressional intent in regard to the showing of
necessity. 13
This lack of explanation of the necessity requirement has permit-
ted courts to interpret its meaning with few restrictions and has led to
the virtual "reading out" of the requirement from Title In.' 4 Research
has revealed no case holding that the showing of necessity required by
Title III has not been met in an application for an interception order.
Boilerplate allegations of necessity are frequently accepted as sufficient
showings. 15 Judicial opinions dealing with the necessity issue usually
have treated the requirement and the factual situation in which the ap-
plication arises in a cursory manner, simply finding that the require-
ment has been met.' 6
11. Title III only requires that the application for the interception order contain
a "full and complete statement" about the need for the use of electronic surveillance.
Id. § 2518(1) (c) (1968). Title III does not require the judge approving an application
to include in his order the reasons for, the criteria of, or the information evaluated in
determining whether or not the necessity requirement has been met. In fact the judge
need not even include a simple finding of necessity in the authorization order. See note
102 infra. But see United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 435 (D. Md. 1973).
This interpretation results from the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970), specifying
what must be contained in the interception order, fails to make any reference to the ne-
cessity requirement. Therefore, the actual criteria by which the necessity requirement
is interpreted remain unarticulated.
12. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2 [hereinafter referred to in text as Senate Report].
13. Id. at 101. The report's explanation of the necessity requirement is extraordi-
narily sparse, especially in light of the fact that "[b]ecause of the complexity in the
area of wiretapping and electronic surveillance, [the Senate Judiciary Committee] be-
lieves that a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of title I would be appropriate in
order to make explicit congressional intent in this area." Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
14. But cf. United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 197 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
15. See text accompanying notes 132-48 infra.
16. E.g., United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 74-974); United States v. Brick,
502 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1015-16
(D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1973), va-
cated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982-
83 (4th Cir. 1973), cert denied sub nom. Gray v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S.
Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 73-231); United States v. Buschmann, 386 F. Supp. 822, 827 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); United States v. Halmo, 386 F. Supp. 593, 595-96 (E.D. Wis. 1975);
United States v. Carubia, 377 F. Supp. 1099, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v.
Herrmann, 371 F. Supp. 343, 347 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Staino, 358 F.
Supp. 852, 856-57 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. DeCesaro, 349 F. Supp. 546, 551
(E.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 307-08 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 506 F.2d
837 (5th Cir. 1975).
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The United States Supreme Court has yet to deal directly with the
necessity requirement of Title 11.17 The uncertainties surrounding
this requirement warrant a thorough analysis of the requirement, its
basis, and its implementation by the courts.
I. Title I Provisions
Title HI is an attempt by Congress to provide law enforcement
agencies with a judicially supervised procedure for the authorization of
the limited use of electronic surveillance. It prohibits any person from
willfully intercepting or disclosing the contents of any wire or oral com-
munication 8 unless the person is a party to the communication or has
17. Two petitions for certiorari have directly raised the necessity requirement issue.
United States v. Bynum, vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); Fein v. United
States, cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975).
Mr. Justice Powell, in a dissent in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974),
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, does discuss the
necessity issue in passing, finding that the affidavits in support of the application "estab-
lished the inadequacy of alternative investigative means and demonstrated that without
a wiretap . . . narcotics agents would be unable to discover his source of supply or
method of distribution." Id. at 560. But there is no discussion of the requirement be-
yond the bare assertion that it had been met. Since compliance with the necessity re-
quirement was not an issue before the Court, it is difficult to assess the weight to be
attached to the finding.
The Supreme Court has dealt with some Title II issues. In Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court held that a person has standing to challenge the
legality of interceptions only if an actual participant in the intercepted conversations or
if such interceptions occurred on the person's premises. Id. at 179-0. Once the illegality
of the interceptions is established, all intercepted conversations must be turned over to the
defendant so that fruit of the poisonous tree issues may be adequately resolved. Id. at
182. The Court held in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972), that the national security exception to Title III does not apply to electronic sur-
veillance in domestic security matters involving domestic dissidents, where an appropri-
ate prior warrant procedure is required. Id. at 301-08. In Gelbard v. United States,
408 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court upheld a grand jury witness' right to refuse to answer
questions based on illegally seized conversations of the witness since 18 U.S.C. § 2515
(1968) expressly so provides. But cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
In United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974), the Court held that Title M requires
the naming of a person in the interception application and order only if there is probable
cause to believe the person is committing the offense for which the interception order
is sought. In United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), the Court held an inter-
ception unlawful under Title III when the application order was approved by the attor-
ney general's executive assistant, not the attorney general or a specially designated assist-
ant attorney general, as required by Title III. In United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S.
562 (1974), it was held that an interception order complied with Title III if the attorney
general had actually approved the interception application even though a specially desig-
nated assistant attorney general was identified as the one approving the application.
In these cases the necessity requirement received no more than passing attention.
See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153-54 n.12 (1974); United States v. Gior-
dano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 527, 531, 561 (1974).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1968).
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prior consent from a party to the conversation. 19 Title IMI does permit,
however, limited use of electronic surveillance by federal law enforce-
ment officials in the investigation of specified federal offenses, as well
as conspiracy to commit such offenses.20 It also permits limited use
of electronic surveillance by state law enforcement officials for certain
specified offenses, and for any other state offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year, if the offense is specified in a
state statute authorizing the use of electronic surveillance.21
Before an application for an interception order may be made to
a judge, the attorney general of the United States, or a specially
designated assistant attorney general, must approve the application.22
This procedure was established to insure that a responsible public
official determines the need and justifiability of each interception appli-
cation.2
The key provisions of Title Ill are contained in section 2518.24
This section specifies the procedures by which applications for intercep-
tion orders must be made and the process by which they are to be au-
thorized by the judge. These procedures were adopted to accomodate
the constitutional requirements for the use of electronic surveillance
prescribed by Berger v. New York 2' and Katz v. United States.
26
Central to the Title III procedure is the requirement that prior to the
use of electronic surveillance, law enforcement officials must obtain
judicial authorization by a detached and neutral judge. The only
exceptions to the need for prior judicial authorization are situations
19. Id. § 2511(2)(c)&(d) (1968). This exception derives from the fact that con-
sensual interceptions are not a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970) lists these offenses. It should be noted that the
list is very broad in scope, especially in light of the fact that conspiracy to commit such
offenses is included in the listed offenses.
21. Id. § 2516(2) (1968) lists these offenses. This list of offenses is also very
broad considering its inclusion of all felonies specified in any state statute permitting
the use of electronic surveillance. This provision actually permits the broader use of
electronic surveillance by state law enforcement officials than by federal officials under
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
22. Id. § 2516(1) (1970). See generally United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). In the case of state applica-
tions the approval must be by a public official specified in the state statute permitting
electronic surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1968).
23. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 96-99.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1968).
25. 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (see text accompanying notes 44-49 infra).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (see text accompanying notes 70-76 infra).
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which threaten the national security27 or that involve special emergen-
cies.
28
Each application for an interception order, after approval by the
attorney general, or a specially designated assistant attorney general,
must meet certain requirements. It must contain:
1. A statement of the applicant's authority to make the applica-
tion;29
2. The identity of the official making the application and of the
official authorizing the making of the application; ,
3. A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances
relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that an inter-
ception order should be issued;31
4. A statement of the time period for which the interception will
be needed;82 and
5. A full and complete statement of the necessity of using elec-
tronic surveillance."3
Upon review of the application in light of the above requirements,
a judge may issue an ex parte interception order only if treble probable
cause is found; that is, probable cause to believe that:
1. An individual has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense specified in Title M;34
27. Id. § 2511(3) (1968). But see United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1968). This subsection allows specially designated law
enforcement officials to intercept wire or oral communications when they reasoniably be-
lieve an emergency situation exists involving conspiratorial activities threatening the na-
tional security or characteristic of organized crime. This procedure is permitted only
if it is essential to make the interception before an interception order may be obtained.
But subsequent judicial approval must be obtained to bring the interception within Title
III, with such application being made within forty-eight hours after the interception has
occurred or begins to occur. Such a procedure is needed since: "[O]ften in criminal
investigations a meeting will be set up and the place finally chosen almost simultane-
ously. Requiring a court order in these situations would be tantamount to failing to au-
thorize the surveillance." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 104.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1968).
30. Id. § 2518(1)(a) (1968).
31. Id. § 2518(l)(b) (1968). This statement must include "(i) details as to the
particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular
description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place from
where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type
of communications sought to be intercepted, and (iv) the identity of the person, if
known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." Id.
32. Id. § 2518(1) (d) (1968). The maximum length of time permitted per inter-
ception order is thirty days, though an unlimited number of extensions may be obtained.
Id. § 2518(5) (1968).
33. Id. § 2518(l)(c) (1968).
34. Id. § 2518(3)(a) (1968).
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2. Particular communications concerning the offense will be ob-
tained through the interception; 35 and
3. The facilities or place from which the interception is to be
made are being used, or are about to be used m connection
with the commission of a specified offense.3 6
In addition, the judge must determine whether the necessity require-
ment has been met.37
A judge may not enter an interception order for any period of time
than is longer than necessary to achieve the objective of the authoriza-
tion, and in no event longer than thirty days.38 Finally, every intercep-
tion must be conducted so as to minimize the interception of communi-
cations not otherwise subject to interception. 9
H. Necessity as a Constitutional Requirement
The foundation for the inclusion of the necessity requirement
within the Title I statutory scheme is not clear. This uncertainty is
due to the lack of any meaningful discussion of the necessity require-
ment in the congressional hearings on electronic surveillance resulting
in Title HI40 or the Senate Report accompanying Title DI,41 and the
confusion over the meaning of one of the constitutional limitations on
the use of electronic surveillance articulated in Berger v. New York.
The Senate Report, the most complete explanation of Title f, reveals
only that the necessity requirement is patterned after traditional search
warrant practice and the English procedure for the authorization of the
use of electronic surveillance.42  This implies that the requirement is
grounded only upon a statutory and not a constitutional foundation.
4 3
35. Id. § 2518(3)(b) (1968).
36. Id. § 2518(3)(d) (1968).
37. Id. § 2518(3)(c) (1968).
38. Id. § 2518(5) (1968).
39. Id. § 2518(5) (1968). See generally Note, Minimization of Wire Intercep-
tion: Presearch Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1411 (1974).
40. Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
41. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2.
42. Id. at 101.
43. The Senate Report makes no mention of the necessity requirement as a consti-
tutional requirement. This should be contrasted with the report's explicit reference to
other Title I provisions as constitutional requirements. Id. at 101.
Indeed, the individual views of Sentators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond set
forth in the Senate Report clearly show that they thought the necessity requirement was
purely a statutory and not a constitutional requirement: "[1]f all of the other standards
set out in the Title can be met, we fail to see why the use of [electronic surveillance]
techniques should be further restricted. We note particularly the requirement that other
investigative procedures have been tried or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed
if tried or to be too dangerous. Can we seriously suggest ... that all constitutional
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But the Supreme Court's decision in Berger indicates the necessity
requirement does have a constitutional foundation.
A. Berger v. New York
In Berger v. New York,4" the Court found New York's permissive
electronic surveillance statute violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.45 The statute permitted the entry of an ex parte inter-
ception order upon oath or affirmation stating probable cause to believe
that evidence of a crime may be obtained, a particular description of
the person or persons to be overheard, and the purpose of the intercep-
tion. The maximum permissible duration of an interception order was
sixty days, though this period could be extended if the judge found that
such an extension would be "in the public interest."46
Berger, the defendant, had been convicted of conspiracy to bribe
members of the state liquor authority. The case arose when complaints
were made to a district attorney that state liquor authority agents were
demanding bribes in connection with the issuance of new liquor
licenses. Failure to make such payments would lead to reprisals in the
form of raids and seizures made at the reticent applicant's place of
business. An ex parte interception order was issued on the basis of
evidence of a bribe solicitation obtained by a liquor license applicant
equipped with a recording device.47  From evidence derived from this
interception another ex parte interception order was obtained.
Through this second order the evidence against Berger was produced.
The Court, in analyzing the statute by ordinary search warrant
standards, found the statute unconstitutional for failure:
1. To be particular in describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized;
2. To be particular in describing the crime that has been, is being,
or is about to be committed;
3. To be particular in describing the type of conversation sought
to be seized;
4. To limit execution of the order to prevent search of unauthor-
ized areas and to prevent further searching once the object of
the search is found;
methods of law unforcement [sic] should not be used to attack our mounting crime
problem?" Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
44. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id. at 43.
47. The fact that there was a citizen willing to be used to obtain evidence of the
bribery conspiracy within the state liquor agency raises a question as to whether it was
necessary to resort to the use of electronic surveillance. The Court never discussed this
problem but only referred to a stipulation by the parties that without the electronic sur-
veillance there would have been insufficient evidence upon which to prosecute Berger.
[Vol. 2
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5. To require a showing of probable cause at shorter intervals to
prevent what was the equivalent of a series of intrusions,
searches, and seizures upon a single showing of probable
cause;
6. To require prompt execution of the order;
7. To require new probable cause to justify the extension of the
interception order;
8. To require a return on the order, and;
9. To require a showing of exigent circumstances to justify the
failure to give the subject of the interception notice prior to
the execution of the warrant.48
The Court emphasized this "exigent circumstances" requirement by
stating:
[T]he statute's procedure, necessarily because its success depends
on secrecy, has no requirement for notice as do conventional war-
rants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some showing
of special facts. On the contrary, it permits unconsented entry
without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such a showing of
exigency, in order to avoid notice, would appear more important
in eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required
when conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized.
49
B. "Exigent Circumstances"
But a problem with the Berger requirement of a showing of
exigent circumstances or special facts before execution of an intercep-
tion order without notice to the subject is that none of the opinions of
the justices describes or explains what is meant by the terms "exigent
circumstances" or "special facts." One thing is certain though-the
showing of exigent circumstances to excuse the lack of presearch notice
is a constitutional requirement, for the Berger holding is based on the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Though the meaning of exigent
circumstances as used in the Berger opinion has not been made clear,
the most persuasive explanation is that it is a reference to what sub-
sequently was codified in Title Il as the necessity requirement.
Therefore the necessity requirement itself, as a codification of the
Berger requirement of exigent circumstances, is a constitutional re-
quirement. Since Berger, three formulations of the definition of
exigent circumstances have been propounded.
1. Destruction of Evidence or Escape of the Suspect
One formulation of exigent circumstances is found in Katz v.
United States,50 decided six months after Berger. In Katz, in a
48. Berger v. New York, 388 U.s. 41, 58-60 (1967).
49. Id. at 60.
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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somewhat cryptic footnote,51 the Court attempted to explain the mean-
ing of exigent circumstances. After citing with approval the procedure
used by law enforcement officers in Osborn v. United States, 2 the
Court reaffirmed the Berger approval of Osborn, where "no greater
invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circum-
stances." 3  The Court then referred to language in Berger that stated
that the protections afforded the defendant in Osborn were "similar
. . . to those. . of conventional warrants," but not identical. 4
A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of
an intended search. But if Osborn had been told in advance that
federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of
making such recordings would obviously have been lost; the evi-
dence in question could not have been obtained. In omitting any
requirement of advance notice, the federal court that authorized
electronic surveillance in Osborn simply recognized, as has this
Court, that officers need not announce their purpose before con-
ducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement
would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of criti-
cal evidence.
Thus the fact that the petitioner in Osborn was unaware that his
words were being electronically transcribed did not prevent this
Court from sustaining his conviction, and did not prevent the Court
in Berger from reaching the conclusion that the use of the recording
device sanctioned in Osborn was entirely lawful.55
This explanation implies that the Court defines exigent circum-
stances as those situations where notice, if given, would lead to the de-
struction of evidence or would allow a suspect to escape. But this inter-
pretation of exigent circumstances is inapposite to situations where
electronic surveillance is to be used. There would usually be no
danger of a suspect escaping, for electronic sun-aillance is used
primarily to obtain the incriminating evidence against the subject, not
51. Id. at 355 n.16.
52. 385 U.S. 323 (1966). In Osborn, the Court approved a consensual intercep-
tion where one party to the conversation had used a recorder to record the conversation,
finding such a procedure as not being a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. In any event, the Court found that the recording was made in such a manner,
with prior judicial approval, that it would have met the requircments of the Fourth
Amendment if they were applicable.
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 (1967), quoting from Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
54. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 (1967).
55. Id. at 355-56 n.16 (emphasis added). The Court seemed to be implying that
the consensual recording of the conversations in Osborn might come within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. But when the Court later reconsidered the issue of con-
sensual interceptions in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the holding of
Osborn was reaffirmed.
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after sufficient incriminating evidence has already been obtained.56
The suspect would not need to escape, but at most would be put on
notice and would therefore alter his pattern of operations. Obviously,
evidence could not be destroyed if notice were given prior to the execu-
tion of the order since the "evidence" does not yet exist. The object
of electronic surveillance is not to obtain evidence already in existence
but to obtain evidence that will be created in the future through the
interception of future communications. If presearch notice were given,
no evidence would be destroyed; it simply would not materialize since
the communications intended to be intercepted would no doubt be
made, if at all, where they could not be intercepted. 57  Thirdly, this
formulation fails to address the issue of whether the use of electronic
surveillance is justified under the particular circumstances of each case.
The formulation merely presumes the justifiability of the use of
electronic surveillance.
But, as has been recognized by the Court, electronic surveillance
will not be successful unless presearch notice is withheld.58 Therefore,
exigent circumstance must have some relation to the initial determina-
tion to be made on the use of electronic surveillance, for once the de-
termination has been made to make interceptions, notice must be with-
held for the interceptions to be successful in obtaining evidence. This
formulation, by discussing the requirement of notice as if in some
instances notice may have to be given before the interceptions are
made, does not take full account of the debilitating effects of presearch
notice. It also fails to recognize that the term exigent circumstances
is inextricably related to the showing that must be made prior to the
authorization of electronic surveillance to allow a procedure that
requires a withholding of presearch notice.
56. But see United States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp. 852, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United
States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929, 933 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Mainello,
345 F. Supp. 863, 873-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033,
1042 (D. Md.), affd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
57. "-J]f Osborn had been told in advance that federal officers intended to record
his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously have been lost;
the evidence in question could not have been obtained." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 355 n.16 (1967).
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 639 (1974); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 774 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied sub nom. Gray v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975)
(No. 73-231); United States v. Forlano, 358 F. Supp. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United
States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom., United
States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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2. Thwarting of an Investigation
Another formulation of the meaning of exigent circumstances is
found in the Senate floor debate on Title DI. Senator McClellan, a
sponsor of one of the bills from which Title III derived and the most
ardent spokesman for Title I, viewed exigent circumstances as mean-
ing "a reasonable likelihood that a continuing investigation would be
thwarted by alerting any of the persons subject to surveillance to the
fact that such surveillance had occurred."'5 9
This formulation appears to ignore the direct command of Berger
regarding the withholding of presearch notice by referring only to the
withholding of notice after "such surveillance had occurred." But even
if this formulation was viewed in a presearch context, as required by
Berger, it also fails to address the initial issue of the justifiability of the
use of electronic surveillance by presuming its justifiability. In this
regard it therefore fails to take account of the considerations articulated
above in the third criticism of the Katz formulation of exigent circum-
stances. By presuming that in some instances notice may be required
to be given before the interceptions are made, it does not take full
account of the effects that presearch notice will have on the successful
use of electronic surveillance; nor does it recognize the relationship
between the term exigent circumstances and the showing that must be
made prior to the authorization of the use of electronic surveillance to
allow a procedure that requires a withholding of presearch notice.
3. The Inadequacy of Normal Investigative Procedures
This leads to the third and most persuasive formulation of the
meaning of exigent circumstances-that the Court in Berger was refer-
ring to the necessity requirement subsequently codified in Title HI.
This formulation does take full account of the fact that once intercep-
tions are authorized presearch notice must be withheld for such
interceptions to be successful, and the formulation is directly addressed
to the issue of when the use of electronic surveillance is justifiable.
This inherent relationship of exigent circumstances and the necessity
requirement, has been recognized in a few instances. Senator Tydings,
speaking during the floor debate on Title II, said:
Mr. Justice Clark [in Berger v. New York] recognized what is the
distinct difference between a conventional warrant and the elec-
tronic surveillance warrant: the electronic surveillance warrant
depends for its success on the absence of notice. Yet Mr. Justice
Clark observed the New York statute Tequired no showing of"special facts" or "exigent circumstances" to overcome the normal
requirement of pre-search notice. Here Mr. Justice Clark was
referring to the analogous situation sustained by the Court in Ker
59. 114 CONG. Rlc. 14479 (1968).
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[sic] v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), a case in which he
authored the majority opinion . . . Such a showing of "special
facts" or "exigent circumstances" would unquestionably be met by
a legislative requirement that judicial authorization for the use of
electronic surveillance techniques be conditioned on a showing, for
example, that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried."
This is the English standard now for the use of wiretapping on the
Home Secretary's warrant.
60
Senator Tydings, in making these comments, was giving an almost
verbatim recital of testimony given at the Senate hearings on Title Ill
by Professor G. Robert Blakey,6' who, as preparer of the bills that
eventually evolved into Title III and as the reporter for the ABA
Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance,62 is regarded as probably
the foremost academic spokesman for the legitimation of electronic sur-
veillance.
Professor Blakey also co-authored a law review article in 1967
proposing an electronic surveillance control act.63  In the proposed
statute he included the necessity requirement in essentially the same
wording as it appears in Title 1I. 64 The comment accompanying the
inclusion of the necessity requirement clearly equates the requirement
with the Berger constitutional requirement of a showing of exigent cir-
cumstances. 65
The ABA Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance also dis-
cusses the necessity requirement as being of constitutional dimensions
under the Berger requirement of a showing of exigent circumstances. 6
The comment upon the necessity requirement, very similar to the com-
ment in Professor Blakey's article, finds that the requirement may be
dispensed with where announcement might result in the destruction of
evidence subject to seizure.6 7 But it goes on to state:
To overcome the general rule [of requiring notice] a showing of ad-
ditional "special facts" or "exigent circumstances" is constitu-
tionally required. Berger v. New York 385 [sic] U.S. 41, 60
(1967). The standard thus requires that a showing be made that
other investigative procedures, that is, those procedures which are
60. 114 CoNG. REG. 12987 (1968).
61. Hearings, supra note 40, at 935.
62. ABA PROJECT ON MIMinuM STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUSrnCE-STADARDS
RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as
ABA STANDARDS and referred to in text as ABA Standards Relating to Electronic Sur-
veillance].
63. Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOMRE
DAim LAw. 657 (1967-68).
64. Id. at 673.
65. Id. at 673 n.35.
66. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 62, at 139.
67. Id. at 139-40.
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normally conducted with notice, have been tried ,and bave failed or
appear unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. Such
a showing in each case is necessary to meet the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment that governs the "exigent
circumstances" exception. A blanket rule, which would dispense
with notice in an entire class of cases, would probably be impermis-
sible.68
Frank S. Hogan, district attorney of New York county and a
staunch advocate of the permissive use of electronic surveillance, and
probably the most experienced prosecutor in its use, has also discussed
the necessity requirement as being equivalent to the exigent circum-
stances showing required by Berger. In testimony before the Senate
on what a permissive electronic surveillance statute should contain, he
stated:
Finally, a section should be drawn dealing with notice. This would
seem to be the sticking point. Obviously, as recognized even by
Justice Clark, secrecy is the essence of this mode of search. In
all but the rarest cases, advance notice to anyone connected with
the facility or premises under surveillance would utterly destroy the
value of the -tap. So -the majority [in Berger] allows that what they
deem a "defect" can be overcome by what they term "a showing
exigent circumstances." I interpret that phrase to mean that the
secret surveillance is necessary because other conventional access
to evidence has proven fruitless or is patently unavailing, that the
conversations are expected to provide material evidence otherwise
inaccessible, and that secrecy is an imperative condition of effec-
tiveness.69
C. Katz v. United States
Katz v. United States70 lends additional support to the view that
electronic surveillance should only be authorized when necessity is
shown. In Katz, the government, without prior judicial approval,
attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of
a public telephone booth from which Katz was suspected of transmitting
wagering information. Agents intercepted Katz's part of the conversa-
tions in the booth, turning on the device only when Katz entered the
booth. The Court found these interceptions violative of the privacy
upon which Katz justifiably relied, and an unconstitutional search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 71
But the Court emphasized that nonconsensual electronic surveil-
lance is not per se unconstitutional. This allayed the concern of many
that Berger v. New York and its strict interpretation of what is consti-
68. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
69. Hearings, supra note 40, at 1113 (emphasis added).
70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71. Id. at 351-53.
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tutionally required to permit electronic surveillance all but precluded,
sub silentio, any use of electronic surveillance:
72
[I]t is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed
that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for
such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was
to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would
entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate
safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Govern-
ment asserts in fact took place.
73
The Court emphasized in Katz, as it had in Berger, that "no
greater invasion of privacy was permitted than that necessary under the
circumstances. 7 4  This seems a clear reference to the requirement of
necessity, for electronic surveillance has been viewed as a more serious
invasion of privacy than other types of investigative procedures.75 If
such other conventional procedures could be successfully used if tried,
then the more serious invasion of privacy involved with the use of elec-
tronic surveillance is neither necessary nor justifiable. 0
D. Other Recognition of the Constitutional Basis
of the Necessity Requirement
The ABA Standards Relating To Electronic Surveillance, Senator
Tydings, Professor Blakey, and New York County District Attorney
Frank Hogan, have all discussed the necessity requirement as being
constitutionally based. Several courts also have recognized the consti-
tutional basis of the necessity requirement, as derived from the Berger
requirement of exigent circumstances to justify the failure to give pre-
search notice before the use of electronic surveillance. 77 These cases
72. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967); Id. at 88 (Black, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 89 (Harlan, I., dissenting); id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (dictum).
74. Id. at 355 (emphasis added), quoling from Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
57 (1967).
75. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 202 (1969) (Fortas, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56, 63 (1967);
id. at 69 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,
352-54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441
(1963) (Warren, CJ., concurring in the result); id. at 465-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76. Cf. United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1362-63 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
77. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1303 n.14 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Forlano, 358 F. Supp. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1362-63 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United
States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 307-08 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D. Fla. 1970), re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.
1973) (per curiam). See United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 1973),
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buttress the conclusion that the severe invasion of privacy entailed by
the use of electronic surveillance without presearch notice can be justi-
fied only if normal means of investigation have failed, would be
unsuccessful if tried, or be too dangerous. Finally, the United States
Department of Justice, in its brief in United States v. Giordano,78 dis-
cusses the necessity requirement as a constitutional requirement:
Title I1 contains provisions incorporating the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment as enunciated by this Court. These provi-
sions, which protect the individual's right of privacy, relate to the
district judge's determination of probable cause, his finding of
necessity for the use of wire interception, and the terms of the order
he enters. There is no claim here . . . that these Fourth Amend-
ment provisions were not complied with completely.
[These provisions derive] directly from this Court's opinions in
Berger and Katz. . 79
From the foregoing discussion it seems clear that the necessity re-
quirement has a constitutional foundation. Though there is some
question about what was meant by the term exigent circumstances
articulated in Berger v. New York, the most persuasive interpretation
is that it refers to a showing of necessity to justify the use of electronic
surveillance-a showing that has been codified in Title III by what has
been referred to as the necessity requirement-that normal investiga-
tive procedures have been tried and failed, or reasonably appear
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.
I. Standards of Construction:
Title I and the Necessity Requirement
Several courts have acknowledged that the necessity requirement
has a constitutional foundation. Most courts that have dealt with the
necessity requirement, however, have not. Consequently the standards
which have been applied in determining whether the necessity require-
ment has been met have placed substantial reliance upon the congres-
sional intent behind Title ITI and previous judicial interpretations of
such intent. But such standards are based primarily upon the assump-
tion that the necessity requirement has only a statutory and not a
constitutional foundation. Therefore, such standards may not reflect
the more stringent standards and degree of compliance that might be
cert. denied sub nom. Gray v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975)
(No. 73-231). Contra, e.g., United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914, 921 (D. Del.
1971).
78. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).




required if the constitutional basis of the necessity requirement were
recognized.
A. Title i
A major underlying purpose of Title HII was to protect the privacy
of wire and oral communications by establishing comprehensive pro-
cedures for regulating the use of electronic surveillance. Judges who
authorize the use of electronic surveillance under Title III must strictly
adhere to the statute's procedures and the congressional intent behind
the establishment of such procedures. In the Senate Report several
senators emphasized the strictness of the procedures to be used and
of the judicial supervision to be made over the use of these procedures:
Title ]II... would authorize carefully circumscribed and strictly
controlled electronic surveillance .... 80
This. . . electronic surveillance would always be under strict court
supervision. 8'
[T]he right of privacy of our citizens will be carefully safeguarded
by a scrupulous system of impartial court authorized supervision.
8 2
Senator McClellan, sponsor of one of the bills that formed the
basis of Title Ill, has continually emphasized the need for the strict
adherence to the procedures and standards of the statute, as well as
its underlying congressional intent. During Senate hearings on this bill
ho stated:
I would not want any loose administration of this law.
[I would have it] very strictly observed. It is not to become a
catchall for promiscuous use. I want to see this law strictly
observed with the courts adhering to the spirit and intent of it in
granting the orders.83
80. SENATE REpoRa, supra note 2, at 214 (individual view of Senator Scott).
81. Id. at 220 (individual view of Senator Eastland).
82. Id. at 225 (individual views of Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thur-
mond).
83. Hearings, supra note 40, at 508. In addition, in reporting on the first year of
operation of Title III, Senator McClellan stated: "[E]ven a cursory reading of the pro-
visions [of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1968)] demonstrates that the standard set out in Title
I cannot be too easily met.
"I hope... that our judiciary... is always taking the necessary time to examine
and pass on all applications thoroughly. The part they must play in scrutinizing and
questioning these applications as well as requiring strict adherence to the statutory stand-
ards cannot be overemphasized."
115 CONG. Ruc. 23240 (1969).
"Tlhe only way this legislation will be effective. . . is by strict adherence to the
standards it contains. Id. at 23241.
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All of the justices on the Supreme Court have recognized the
strictness with which Title H must be implemented. In United States
v. Chavez,8 4 the majority said that "strict adherence by the Government
to the provisions of Title II would be... in keeping with the
responsibilities Congress has imposed .. .8.,5 Justice Douglas, in
dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, stated that
"the history of Title I reflects a desire that its provisions be strictly
construed."8 6 The lower federal courts also have recognized the strict-
ness required by the procedures of Title ]n. 87 They have found that
strict construction is required from an examination of the congressional
intent behind Title III and the need to protect adequately interests of
personal privacy against the inherent dangers involved in the use of
electronic surveillance.
B. The Requirement of Necessity
Notwithstanding this general agreement that the procedures of
Title III must be strictly construed and be strictly complied with, the
federal courts, in construing the necessity requirement when it is raised
"[M]y purpose . . . has been to help assure that this legislation will be, in fact,
followed to the strictest letter of the law-both in bringing criminals to book and pro-
tecting citizens' privacy.
"If the statute is strictly followed, it is certainly not to be expected that any unnec-
essary invasion of privacy will result." Id. at 23242.
84. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
85. Id. at 580.
86. Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accord,
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1972) (there must be compliance with
the "stringent" conditions of Title III). See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505
(1974); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
87. United States v. Bellosi, 501 F.2d 833, 836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S.
Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 74-659); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 468 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 639 (1974); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 684
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Boone, 348 F.
Supp. 168, 170 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1109, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 421 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Forcarile,
340 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (D. Md.), affd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), af'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v.
Kleve, 337 F. Supp. 557, 562 (D. Minn. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 465 F.2d 187
(8th Cir. 1972); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modi-
fied on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974);
United States v. Eastman, 326 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (M.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd on other
grounds, 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295,
298 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson,
472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973). But cf. United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1973) (dictum) (illegal wiretap evidence could be used to impeach the defendant).
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on a suppression motion, have not adhered to this standard of strictness.
Several different formulations of the standard of compliance to be
applied to the necessity requirement have been suggested. All of
these formulations find that the requirement may be satisfied by less
than strict compliance with Title mIs provisions. The main rationale
for this relaxed standard is the discussion of the necessity requirement
found in the Senate Report. The report states that the requirement
is patterned after traditional search warrant practice, and that the
determination of whether necessity exists entails a consideration of all
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.88
Courts have found the key operational sentence in the report's
guidelines on the requirement of necessity to be: "[w]hat the provi-
sion envisions is that the showing be tested in a practical and common-
sense fashion."8' 9 Several federal courts have adopted this practical and
commonsense fashion test.90 When it has been used it has become a
simple basis upon which to make a rather conclusory finding of
necessity, with a recitation of various allegations of the interception
application affidavit being considered sufficient to support the finding.
Other courts have found that there need be only "substantial com-
pliance" with the necessity requirement.91 The finding of requisite
necessity under this test has also been made upon the basis of affidavit
allegations that are simply found to be "sufficient." A serious problem
88. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 101.
89. Id. at 101. The report cites United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965),
as shedding some light on the words "practical and commonsense fashion."
"This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits which are
purely conclusory, stating only the affiant's or an informer's belief. . . without detailing
any of the "underlying circumstances" upon which that belief is based. Recital of some
of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to per-
form his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Id.
at 108-09 (1965) (footnote omitted).
90. In re Dunn, 507 F.2d 195, 196 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Robertson,
504 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975)
(No. 74-974); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 224 n.15 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Whitaker,
343 F. Supp. 358, 362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973). In none of these cases was the strictness of
the procedures of Title M mentioned.
91. United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 889-90 (D.N.J. 1973), affd on
other grounds, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp.
1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af'd on other grounds, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 535 (S..D Cal.
1971), modified on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
920 (1974). See United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 319 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
remanded on other grounds, sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.
1973) (per curiam). In none of these cases was the strictness of the procedures of Title
II mentioned.
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with decisions that adopt this test is that none of them discuss what
"substantial compliance" means or what the necessity requirement and
compliance with it entails.
Even more troubling are the three cases that have found that the
government's burden in regard to the showing of necessity is "not a
great one."'9 2  In these cases great reliance was placed on the allega-
tions of the affidavits supporting the interception application, with an
apparent acceptance of the conclusory nature of the allegations. In two
of these cases the allegations of the affidavits were substantially
identical.93 Both maintained -that the informants involved refused to
testify and that conventional search warrants are inadequate in gam-
bling offenses since usually insufficient evidence is seized to prove all
the elements of the crime. Upon these two allegations the requirement
of necessity was found to have been met. In the other case, United
States v. Staino,94 the necessity requirement was found to have been
satisfied by an allegation that normal investigative techniques could not
effectively establish the scope of the counterfeiting conspiracy involved.
The problem with this test is that it utterly ignores and directly contra-
dicts the congressional intent and judicial recognition that the proced-
ures of Title IL be strictly construed and be strictly complied with.
A serious inadequacy of all of these tests-practical and common-
sense fashion, substantial compliance, and "not a great burden"-is that
they become evocative words that inexorably lead to a "clear,"
summary finding of necessity without intervening analytical steps that
would require an explication of the criteria and facts being evaluated
in determining whether necessity exists. The finding is made, but the
basis for the finding and the analysis leading to that finding remain un-
articulated.
Still another test that has been used has been to regard the
purpose and intent of the necessity requirement as only one of insuring
that a showing be made of the difficulties that would be encountered
in the use of normal investigative techniques.95 Though this test,
92. United States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp. 852, 856-57 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United
States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 414-15 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. Whitaker,
343 F. Supp. 358, 362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973). In none of these cases was the strictness of
the procedures of Title III mentioned.
93. United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 414-15 (D. Md. 1972); United
States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
94. 358 F. Supp. 852, 856-57 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
95. United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 74-974); United States v. Pacheco, 489
F.2d 554, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975)
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focusing on the difficulties involved in the use of normal investigative
techniques, does attempt to identify at least one of the elements
involved in the making of the finding of necessity, it has been a
relatively easily satisfied test. To make the required showing of diffi-
culty in using normal investigative techniques has been a simple matter
of alleging whatever difficulties are inherent in the particular situation
for which an interception order is sought. Frequently used allegations
are the need to determine the scope of -the alleged conspiracy and the
identity of its members, the fact that narcotics dealers have only a few
trusted associates, or that -traditional search warrants do not produce
evidence on all the elements of gambling offenses. When such allega-
tions are made, a conclusion that such difficulties are sufficient to show
the necessity for the entry of an interception order has been found to
follow easily.
The problem with this test is that it ignores the explicit wording
of the necessity requirement; namely, that normal investigative pro-
cedures have been tried and have failed, or reasonably appear unlikely
to succeed if tried or -to be too dangerous. Instead this test substitutes
the requirement of a mere showing that normal investigative pro-
cedures would be difficult to use. But the necessity requirement is
not met by merely showing difficulty; there must be a showing that nor-
mal procedures are inadequate since unsuccessful, unlikely to succeed,
or too dangerous. A showing that the use of normal investigative pro-
cedures would be difficult does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that such procedures would be inadequate since unsuccessful or too
dangerous. The use of this test seriously undercuts the explicit word-
ing of the necessity requirement and changes the focus of the showing,
making it much easier to meet.
An example of the ease with which this "difficulty" test may be
met is found in United States v. Robertson.96 In Robertson, an agent
disclosed at an evidentiary hearing on the necessity issue that, though
physical surveillance of the defendant was possible, it was impractical
since the agent was white and the gambling operations were located
in a black neighborhood. To call in black undercover agents would
have been costly and inconvenient, though such agents were available.
The court, coupling the "difficulty" test with the "practical and
commonsense fashion" test, found that the government was not
required to call in other agents to meet the showing of necessity
required before an interception order could be entered. Apparently
(No. 73-1510); United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929, 933 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United
States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 535 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modified on other grounds, 478
F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
96. 504 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14,
1975) (No. 74-974).
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the testimony of the agent was found to be a sufficient basis upon which
to uphold the original finding of necessity. In addition, the court found
-the allegation that the scope and extent of the gambling operation still
needed to be determined as further support for the upholding of the
initial finding of necessity.
Some courts have also permitted the necessity requirement ap-
parently to be more easily met for certain types of alleged offenses than
for others. Allegations of a large scale conspiracy,97 gambling opera-
tions,98 narcotics operations,99 or the fact that wire communications are
usually an ingredient of the offense' 00 have, in some instances, been
accorded more deferential treatment by courts in their review of
whether a sufficient showing of necessity has been made. This sort
of deference to the type of crime alleged, or to certain characteristics
of such crimes, without a rigorous examination of the actual factual con-
text in which the case arose is in direct contradiction to the congres-
sional intent that the determination of necessity be made upon "a con-
sideration of all the facts and circumstances" of the particular case. 101
All of these different tests and interpretations of the standards to
be applied to the necessity requirement fail to comply with the overall
congressional intent that the requirements of Title InI be strictly
97. United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 873-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United
States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 419-20 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. King, 335
F. Supp. 523, 535 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 304 (S.D. Fla.
1970), remanded sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam).
98. E.g., United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982-83 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied
sub nom. Gray v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 73-231);
United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 201 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143 (1974);
United States v. Carubia, 377 F. Supp. 1099, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v.
Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 30 (M.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp.
408, 414-15 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. DeCesaro, 349 F. Supp. 546, 551 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), rev'd, 502 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp.
863, 873-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Pa.
1971).
99. E.g., United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 889-90 iD.N.J. 1973), aff'd,
505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 303 (S.D.
Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam). See United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
100. United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub
nom. Gray v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 73-231);
United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929, 933 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Leta,
332 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295,
303 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
101. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 101 (emphasis added). "A blanket rule,
which would dispense with notice in an entire class of cases, would probably be imper-
missible." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 62, at 140.
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construed and applied. This is in large measure attributable to the con-
flict between this general intent and the specific comment concerning
the necessity requirement found in the Senate Report that states that
the requirement is to be interpreted in a "practical and commonsense
fashion." Because of the less strict standards applied to the construc-
tion of the necessity requirement, the criteria and factors used to
determine the adequacy of the showing of necessity remain unarticu-
lated. Courts base many of their conclusions on perfunctory reasoning
and uncritical reliance on the allegations of interception application
affidavits. The necessity requirement is an essential provision for the
protection of the privacy of wire and oral communications, one of the
main purposes behind Title HI. Close attention to this requirement
seems compelled by recognition of its constitutional foundations. But
courts have failed to accord appropriate attention to this requirement
and strictly to construe and apply it so as to protect adequately the pri-
vacy of wire and oral communications.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing discussion has focused
solely upon the interpretation given the necessity requirement by
federal courts in deciding suppression motions based on a contention
of a failure to meet the requirement, or in deciding appeals from such
decisions. But the initial decisions on the authorization of electronic
surveillance are not made at such suppression hearings. They are
made by judges upon an application for an interception order. These
judges must make a finding of necessity before the use of electronic
surveillance is permitted.
Several courts have interpreted this to mean only that the judge
must make a determination of necessity, not that such a finding need
be stated in the interception order, or that the facts and circumstances
relied upon by the judge and the reasons for the finding of necessity
be stated.10  The judge is not required to place a full and complete
statement of the reasons for the finding of necessity in the interception
order.'0 3  This interpretation of the necessity requirement derives from
the language of Title III that requires the judge to make a determina-
tion of necessity, but does not specify that the finding of necessity must
be among the items included in the interception order.'04 Therefore,
the basis for the initial decision on the issue of necessity may remain
102. United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 874 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United
States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a! 'd, 480 F.2d 764 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295,
304 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam). But see United States v. Curredi, 363 F. Supp. 430, 435 (D.
Md. 1973).
103. Cases cited note 102 supra.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970). See note 11 supra.
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entirely undisclosed. And since there has been no case discovered in
researching this note in which the necessity requirement has not been
found to have been met, this initial determination is all but conclusive
on the issue of necessity.
Some judges do include a statement of their findings on the issue
of necessity in their interception orders. 10 5 But these statements are
couched in such conclusory terms as "normal investigative procedures
reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried."1016 Thus, even when
a statement concerning the finding of necessity is included in the
interception order, it is set forth in a form that fails to disclose the fac-
tual and analytical basis for the determination. As a result, regardless
of whether a-finding of necessity is included in the interception order,
the critical point at which the all but conclusive determination of neces-
sity is made remains completely unarticulated. This prevents any close
scrutiny of the interpretation or construction given the necessity re-
quirement in the first instance.
In addition, many judges who have authorized interceptions have
also been the judge hearing the suppression motion challenging the
finding of necessity.107 Though this procedure would possibly allow
the discovery of some of the criteria used in initially authorizing the
interception order and how the authorizing judge construed the neces-
sity requirement, there is also considerable pressure upon the judge to
uphold the interception order he initially entered and a definite
potential bias on his part.
The potential bias is obvious: the judge has already made a prior
determination that necessity has been shown for that particular order
and that determination is now being challenged as being inadequate.
The pressure on the judge derives from the fact that law enforcement
officers, relying on the interception order, have expended a consider-
105. E.g., United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415
U.S. 143 (1974); United States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
affd, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Cur-
reri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 435 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233,
245 (D.D.C. 1971).
106. E.g., Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Intercep-
tion of Wire and Oral Communications, No. NDC-27, (N.D. Cal., June 11, 1973); Ap-
plication of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Interccption of Wire Com-
munications, No. 5, (N.D. Cal., Mar. 15, 1972); United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp.
430, 435 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 873 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
107. E.g., United States v. Garramone, 374 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(local court rule required the judge authorizing the interceptions to hear all motions at-
tacking the validity of the order); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 879
(D.N.J. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp.
852, 854 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. D'Alfonso, 357 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (ED.
Pa. 1973); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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able amount of time and effort upon making the interceptions and pos-
sibly making further investigation based upon leads received from these
interceptions. To decide, after the interceptions have been made, that
the necessity requirement had not been met at the time the intercep-
tions were authorized would require the suppression of all the elec-
tronic surveillance evidence and prohibit any derivative use of it."°8
In summary, judicial interpretations and implementation of the
necessity requirement seem to be in direct conflict with the congres-
sional intent that Title III procedures be strictly construed and applied.
This conflict has risen in part from the abbreviated treatment of the
necessity requirement given in the Senate Report, and the fact that the
report's treatment itself directly conflicts with the expressed congres-
sional intent to apply and construe strictly Title Il's provisions. The
necessity requirement is a key provision in the attempt to protect
privacy interests. But the basis of the initial determination of necessity
remains shrouded in a conclusory statement in the interception order,
if such a finding is included at all. Therefore the interpretations and
construction given the necessity requirement in the first instance remain
unknown and indiscernible.
IV. The Necessity Requirement in Factual Context
Since the determination of necessity should be made upon consid-
eration of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, a full
understanding of how the requirement has been construed and imple-
mented is essential. Therefore it is important to examine the factual
context in which applications are made and interception orders entered.
Three problems that are confronted in attempting to discuss the
necessity requirement in its factual context are inadequate reporting of
the facts and circumstances surrounding cases, the averments of the
interception application affidavit, and the basis of the finding of neces-
sity. Notwithstanding these problems, the factual context of a few
cases shall be examined to aid in an understanding of the present effec-
tiveness of the necessity requirement in protecting the privacy of wire
and oral communications.
A. United States v. Bynum
In United States v. Bynum an interception order was obtained for
both wire and oral communications. The interception was authorized
to obtain evidence of alleged illegal narcotics activities, the extent and
scope of the related conspiracy and the identity of its members, and
the alleged bribery and corruption of law enforcement officials in
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1968).
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futherance of the conspiracy.10 9 Bynum and another defendant,
Cordovano, were the central figures in the conspiracy that encompassed
purchasing, processing, distribution, and sale of various narcotics.
Prior to obtaining the interception order, the government conducted
extensive visual surveillance and had received information about the
operation from several informants' One such informant, Stewart, an
alleged lieutenant in the organization, 110 became an informant after he
had been arrested for narcotics sales to undercover agents. Stewart's
role in the operation was important; he was selling heroin and cocaine
for Cordovano and picking up and delivering large amounts of heroin
sold to Bynum and Cordovano by their suppliers.
Stewart, while acting as "a trusted key member of the con-
spiracy,"'11 reported to law enforcement officers daily,"12 "supplying
the Government with detailed information '""3 about the conspirators
and the operation. Stewart continued to sell and deliver heroin for
Bynum and Cordovano. At this point the interception order was
obtained. Stewart remained an integral part of the conspiracy and a
trusted member. Cordovano and Bynum discussed with Stewart plans
to rob other drug dealers in the area during a narcotics shortage. This
plan was ultimately executed. Stewart contined to make large
purchases for Bynum and Cordovano. He was also present when they
discussed plans to murder a corrupt policeman believed to have turned
informant. Through all of these activities, Stewart remained "fully
accepted as a member of the core group."" 4
At the trial, the government's case rested principally upon Stew-
art's testimony,"x5 samples of drugs he received from Bynum, Cordo-
vano, and the operation's suppliers, photographs of the cash which
Stewart used in the narcotics transactions, and tape recordings made
by Stewart of telephone conversations he had with the defend-
ants." 6 The evidence produced by the electronic surveillance was
109. 360 F. Supp. 400, 408 (S.D.N.Y.), afjjd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). This case originated as United States v. By-
num, 475 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court of appeals remanded the case to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing on another issue.
110. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13, Bynum v. United States, 417 U.S. 903
(1974).
111. United States v. Bynum, remanded, 475 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1973).
112. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, Bynum v. United States, vacated, 417 U.S.
903 (1974).
113. United States v. Bynum, remanded, 475 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1973) (empha-
sis added).
114. United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
115. United States v. Bynum, remanded, 475 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1973).




introduced apparently only to corroborate Stewart's testimony. 17 The
court of appeals emphasized the important role that Stewart played in
the prosecution:
[T]he detailed facts which amply document and support the
Government's case here, are uniquely provided by the informant
witness Stewart, whose regular reports to Government agents
enabled them to independently make surveillance and confirm the
conspiracy and the overt acts charged in the indictment." 8
The defendants contended that electronic surveillance was not
necessary since a plethora of normal investigative techniques had been
successful in obtaining incriminating evidence, and in obtaining infor-
mation on the scope and extent of the conspiracy. The defendants
emphasized the successful and extensive uses to which Stewart had
been put. The affidavit in support of the interception application con-
cluded that "normal investigative procedures reasonably appear un-
likely to succeed and are too dangerous to be used.""19 But the facts
of the case reveal that such procedures were being used successfully.
The court of appeals, in discussing the necessity requirement, found:
A reading of the detailed affidavits which were submitted in sup-
port of the wiretap ...indicating reason to believe that Bynum
had engaged in the corruption of officials and violence against in-
formants, and that he was a long time narcotics violator, amply
supports the issuance of the orders here made. 20
This was the entire discussion in the opinion devoted to the necessity
requirement. The court failed to make any reference to the fact that,
prior to the interception application, the informant was a trusted key
member of the conspiracy providing detailed information and physical
evidence to the government or that he was recording his telephone con-
versations with the other defendants and turning them over to the
government.
B. United States v. James
United States v. James121 involved an interception order obtained
largely upon information received from an informant, Lewis, who
volunteered his services to make the case against one Jackson, allegedly
the largest narcotics wholesaler in the Washington, D.C. area. Lewis'
reliability was established by the fact that he had previously obtained
evidence that was effectively used in obtaining convictions against four
major Washington, D.C. narcotics dealers.
117. United States v. Bynum, remanded, 475 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1973).
118. United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1973).
119. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 12, Bynum v. United States, vacated, 417
U.S. 903 (1974).
120. United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973).
121. 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Prior to the government's application for an interception order,
Lewis phoned Jackson and arranged a purchase of heroin. A narcotics
agent monitored the call with Lewis' consent; therefore the monitoring
was not an "interception" under Title 1n.1 22 Another agent accom-
panied Lewis to the location at which the sale was to be consummated.
Jackson, however, took only Lewis to where the narcotics were
secreted, and a sale was made. A week later Lewis arranged another
sale with Jackson over the telephone. Again, the narcotics agent
monitored the call with Lewis' consent. The sale arranged by this call
was consummated in the presence of the agent. On both occasions
Jackson was alleged to have taken evasive action to prevent visual sur-
veillance by narcotics agents. The interception application affidavit
stated that physical surveillance was not productive because Jackson
was extremely cautious, that he lived in a closely knit neighborhood,
and implied that it was impossible to obtain the local telephone
numbers that Jackson called.123 The court of appeals found that
normal investigative procedures had failed or reasonably appeared un-
likely to succeed in penetrating Jackson's enterprise: 24
Considering the matter in a practical and commonsense fashion we
find that although the informant [Lewis] had made two purchases
of drugs from Jackson it was reasonable to believe that these trans-
actions were only minor items in Jackson's enterprise, and that the
exposure of his entire operation required different and more
sophisticated techniques. Certainly it was clear that surveillance
techniques and infiltration would be frustrated by Jackson's ex-
treme caution.1
2
The court's discussion of the necessity requirement omitted any refer-
ence to the fact that narcotics agents had been able to consensually
monitor the calls made by Lewis to Jackson, witness narcotics sales
made by Jackson, or that Lewis had been instrumental in obtaining con-
victions against other major narcotics dealers in the area.
C. United States v. Fantuzzi
The facts in United States v. Fantuzzi 26 disclose that an inform-
ant, one Estrada, volunteered to supply information concerning a
cocaine importing and distributing organization operated by persons
"with whom she had become closely associated.' 2 7  After becoming
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)&(d) (1968).
123. United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The inference
that the local numbers that Jackson called could not be discovered appears to be a patent
misrepresentation. See text accompanying notes 177-82 infra
124. Id. at 1015.
125. Id. at 1016.
126. 463 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1972).
127. Id. at 684.
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an informant, Estrada met all the members of the alleged conspiracy
through a friend who was one of the conspirators. Through informa-
tion provided by Estrada, the "dimensions of the conspiracy became
apparent."'1 28  She continued to relay information on cocaine transac-
tions to agents. Subsequently another informant began working with
Estrada. Together they executed a ten thousand dollar purchase of
cocaine from two other members of the conspiracy. During this time
Estrada remained a trusted member of the conspiracy, witnessed
numerous cocaine transactions and attended numerous planning discus-
sions, and associated with the conspirators socially on a daily basis.
Despite the fact that the conspiracy was small in scale, Estrada
knew and was trusted by all seven of its members, and was providing
the government with detailed information on the activities of the con-
spirators, the government was able to obtain an interception order.
D. United States v. Poeta
In United States v. Poeta29 the government's case at trial was built
principally on the testimony of an informant, Cohen, and of one of the
main purchasers from the organization. Cohen, a trusted confederate
in the heroin importation and distribution operation, was the go-
between for the operation and it's suppliers and purchasers. He
received instructions from the defendant Poeta on where to make
heroin pickups, to deliver the heroin, and to return the purchase money
to Poeta. Cohen was finally arrested for his part in the operation and
agreed to cooperate with the government in obtaining evidence about
the conspiracy and its activities. Upon release from custody he con-
tinued to work for the organization, providing information and also con-
senting to the monitoring of his telephone and the "bugging" of his
apartment.
Based on information received directly from Cohen and from the
consensual monitoring of his telephone conversations, an interception
order was obtained. In the application affidavit detailed reference was
made to the consensually monitored conversations over Cohen's tele-
phone.13 0 The order relied on the affidavit's averments that normal
investigative means would be difficult in view of the cautious manner
of the persons to be surveilled and their use of narcotics jargon and
Spanish in an effort to disguise their transactions over the telephone. 3'
In all four of the foregoing cases normal investigative procedures
were being used successfully to obtain evidence on the scope and
128. Id.
129. 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972).
130. Id. at 119.
131. Id. at 120.
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extent of the conspiracy, the identity of its members, and, most
importantly, on the high level members of the conspiracy. But in all
the cases an interception order was obtained upon a finding of necessity
by the issuing judge. If interception orders may be obtained under
such circumstances the necessity requirement may well have become
a mere paper provision.
V. The Application Affidavit
A critical component of any interception application is the affidavit
in support of the application. The affidavit is usually incorporated by
reference into the application, with the application containing only a
brief conclusory statement concerning the necessity for using electronic
surveillance. The application and the affidavit, taken together, must
provide a "full and complete statement" as to the necessity of resorting
to the use of electronic surveillance. 182  But these affidavits have
tended to be insufficient in making this required showing by containing
only cursory and conclusory averments of the inadequacy or difficulty
of using normal investigative techniques. Such averments have become
boilerplate terms included in every application where they can con-
ceivably fit the general facts of the case or the type of offense allegedly
involved.
At least one court has recognized that this has occurred. In
United States v. Kahn,'3 the court found that where the government
could have engaged in questioning to obtain additional information such
questioning should have been attempted to meet the necessity require-
ment. If the attempt to gain further evidence by questioning was
unsuccessful, the court failed to see "why the agent could not state the
reason for lack of success ....
The conclusionary [sic] statement in -the application and affidavit
that "normal investigative methods reasonably appear unlikely to
succeed and are too dangerous to be used" is too slender a reed
upon which to rest the invasion of [the defendant's] privacy.
We find no justification in the record for not determining from the
informants used for the government's application and affidavit
whether [the defendant] had received or sent, through the particu-
lar telephone numbers, communications with respect to unlawful
132. United States v. Carubia, 377 F. Supp. 1099, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United
States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 889 (D.NJ. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir.
1974); see United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 874 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United
States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 304 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United
States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
133. 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
134. United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 197 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143
(1974).
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gambling activities; and the government has not shown that had it
conducted its investigation with the care Congress intended to pro-
tect personal privacy, it would not have discovered whether or not
[the defendant] had implicated herself by fher conversations [with
others].1
35
The most conclusory averments included in affidavits, and the one
courts have found of critical importance in determining the necessity
issue, are those stating that due to the nature of the alleged offense
and the manner in which it is perpetrated, normal investigative pro-
cedures appear unlikely to succeed if tried. Such averments are some-
times supported by some factual recitations such as the absence of avail-
able informers,13 the refusal of available informants to testify,187 and
the extreme caution of the subject. 38  But these affidavits fail to meet
the requirement of a "full and complete statement" since the necessity
sections have primarily alleged conclusions derived from the general
experience of officers with the type of offense allegedly involved, and
have not specified the actual experiences or facts of the individual case
in which the application is being made. For example, an examination
of the interception application affidavits filed in two separate gambling
investigations 3 9 revealed that in a critical portion of the affidavits the
exact same wording was used:
My experience and the experience of other Special Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has shown that gambling raids and
searches of gamblers and their gambling establishments have not
in the past resulted in gathering physical or other evidence to prove
all elements of the offense. Through my experience and the exper-
135. Id.
136. E.g., United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 889 (D.N.J. 1973), affd, 505
F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974).
137. E.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 145 (1974); United States v. Brick,
502 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 983 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied sub nom. Gray v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14,
1975) (No. 73-231); United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 414 (D. Md. 1972);
United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States
v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 303
(S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.
1973) (per curiam); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13, Fein v. United States, 42
U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. July 25, 1973) (No. 73-175).
138. In re Dunn, 507 F.2d 195, 196 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. James, 494
F.2d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 889
(D.N.J. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Mainello, 345 F.
Supp. 863, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1043
D. Md.), affd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972),
affd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
139. United States v. Consentino, Criminal No. 72-936 LHB (N.D. Cal., filed July
18, 1974); United States v. Spagnuolo, Criminal No. 73-0342 AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed July
13, 1972).
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ience of other Special Agents who have worked on gambling cases,
I have found that gamblers frequently do not keep records. If such
records are maintained, gamblers immediately prior to or during
physical search destroy these records. Additionally, records that
have been seized in past gambling cases have generally not been
sufficient to establish:
(a) The involvement of all the conspirators in the offenses;
(b) The period of operation which the records reflect, and,
(c) The gross amount of wagers accepted in a single day,
because records are difficult to interpret, and are of little
or no significance without further knowledge of the gam-
bler's activities, associations, and manner and method of
conducting the gambling business. 140
The following paragraph in each of the affidavits explained the general
procedure by which illegal gambling operations are run. The wording
of this paragraph is essentially identical in each affidavit, with minor
word variations. In addition, another portion of the affidavits, though
not similar in wording, alleged that electronic surveillance is needed
to establish the size of the gambling business since normal investigative
procedures are inadequate in this regard.
140. In all of the affidavits examined the averment quoted in the text appeared in
exactly the same wording--even in the two extension application affidavits, where no
new averments for the need for continued suveillance were included.
Four affidavits were examined from the investigation culminating in United States
v. Cosentino, Criminal No. 72-936 LHB (N.D. Cal., filed July 18, 1974); Affidavit in
Support of Application at 16-17, Application of the United States for an Order Authoriz-
ing the Interception of Wire Communications, No. NDC-15 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 21,
1972); Affidavit in Support of Application at 11, Application of the United States for
an Order Authorizing the Continued Interception of Wire Communications, No.
NDC-15 (Extension) (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 21, 1972); Affidavit in Support of Applica-
tion at 17, Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Interception
of Wire Communications, No. NDC-18 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 21, 1972); Affidavit in
Support of Application at 16, Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing
the Interception of Wire Communications, No. NDC-20 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 21,
1972).
Five affidavits were examined from the investigation culminating in United States
v. Spagnuolo, Criminal No. 73-0342 AZ (N.D. Cal., filed July 13, 1972): Affidavit
in Support of Application at 12-13, Application of the United States for an Order Au-
thorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, No. NDC-14 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug.
28, 1972); Affidavit in Support of Application at 12-13, Application of the United States
for an Order Authorizing the Continued Interception of Wire Communications, No.
NDC-14 (Extension) (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1972); Affidavit in Support of Applica-
tion at 15, Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Interception
of Wire Communications, No.-NDC-19 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 28. 1972); Affidavit in
Support of Application at 22-23, Application of the United States for an Order Au-
thorizing the Interception of Wire and Oral Communications, No. NDC-27 (N.D. Cal.,
filed June 11, 1973); Affidavit in Support of Application at 18-19, Application of the
United States for an Order Authorizing the Continued Interception of Wire and Oral
Communications, No. NDC-27 (Extension II) (N.D. Cal., filed June 11, 1973).
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Interception application affidavits involving other crimes also
resort to the use of boilerplate language. In three separate narcotics
cases examined, 141 the affidavits contained almost identical wording in
the portion intended to show the necessity for resorting to electronic
surveillance:
My experiences and the experiences of other Special Agents of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has shown that individ-
uals dealing in large quantities of narcotics are particularly covert
in their activities and wary of surveillance by State and Federal law
enforcement personnel. Such dealers rarely keep records, deal
personally with a very few trusted individuals and isolate them-
selves from other individuals in the distribution organization.
Through experience it has also been learned that individuals deal-
ing in large quantities of narcotics frequently change telephone
numbers to avoid detection and receive, store, and deliver narcotics
at varying locations.'
42
Another boilerplate term found in every affidavit examined,
regardless of the type of offense alleged, is that normal investigative
procedures appear unlikely to succeed in establishing the full extent
of the conspiracy, the identity of all the conspirators or aiders and abet-
tors of the operation, and the hierarchy of the organization.
141. United States v. Chavez, Criminal No. 71-406 SAW (N.D. Cal., filed May 6,
1971), suppression of wiretap evidence aff'd, 478 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416
U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. Yu, Criminal No. 74-202 CBR (N.D. Cal., filed Sept
11, 1974); United States v. Scully, Criminal No. 73-0272 SC (N.D. Cal., filed Apr. 30,
1974).
142. Two affidavits were examined from the investigation culminating in United
States v. Chavez, Criminal No. 71-406 SAW (N.D. Cal., filed May 6, 1971), suppres-
sion of wiretap evidence affd, 478 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 562
(1974): Affidavit in Support of Application at 11, Application of the United States for
an Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, No. 5 (N.D. Cal., filed
Mar. 7, 1972); Affidavit in Support of Application at 6, Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, No. 6 (N.D.
Cal., filed Mar. 7, 1972).
Three affidavits were examined from the investigation culminating in United States
v. Scully, Criminal No. 73-0272 SC (N.D. Cal., filed Apr. 30, 1974): Affidavit in Sup-
port of Application at 4-15, Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing
the Interception of Wire Communications, No. NDC-31 (N.D. Cal., filed June 14,
1973); Affidavit in Support of Application at 46, Application of the United States for
an Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, No. NDC-32 (N.D.
Cal., filed June 14, 1973); Affidavit in Support of Application at 81-82, Application of
the United States for an Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire and Oral Communi-
cations, No. NDC-34 (N.D. Cal., filed June 14, 1973).
Two affidavits were examined from the investigation culminating in United States
v. Yu, Criminal No. 74-202 CBR (N.D. Cal., Sept. 11, 1974): Affidavit in Support of
Application at 13, Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Inter-
ception of Wire Communications, No. NDC-37 (N.D. Cal., filed Apr. 9, 1974); Affi-
davit in Support of Application at 13, Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Continued Interception of Wire Communications, No. NDC-37 (Exten-
sion) (N.D. Cal., filed Apr. 9, 1974).
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From the great similarity in the averments in the affidavits, and
the fact that such averments focus on the general characteristics of the
offense alleged and not the facts of the actual case, it may be concluded
that such averments are employed in a perfunctory manner not com-
mensurate with the express requirements of Title I1. The use of
boilerplate terms to fulfill this constitutional requirement and key pro-
vision intended to insure the protection of privacy of communications
completely undercuts the central focus of the requirement-that a
specific need be shown in each specific case by an examination of the
facts and circumstances involved before the use of electronic surveil-
lance will be authorized.
The danger that boilerplate terms would be developed to meet the
necessity showing was recognized in the Senate floor debate on Title
[Title Ill] further requires a showing that "normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." We
agree with the thought that underlying this requirement, that is,
that wiretapping and eavesdropping should not be used unless
absolutely necessary. [Title I1] should not, however, leave open
the possibility of satisfying this requirement by a boiler plate recital
of the statutory language. It should provide for a description with
particulars of the efforts that have been made to obtain evidence
without wiretapping or eavesdropping and a reasoned justification
of the need for using wiretapping and eavesdropping methods.
143
Senator McClellan, reporting on the first year of operation of Title
II, expressed serious concern over how the necessity requirement was
being implemented. After emphasizing the strictness of the necessity
requirement, and the fact that electronic surveillance may be used only
as a last resort, he continued:
[A] number of the affidavits [in support of the applications] left
something to be desired when it came to demonstrating that"normal investigative techniques" had been exhausted. Here, too
often, the affidavits were phrased in conclusionary [sic] terms, and
not enough of the agency's law enforcement experiences that bore
on the decision to use a technique of surveillance was made explicit
for the court.
I would suggest. . . that the applications should be more complete
on their face.144
143. 114 CONG. REC. 14474 (1968) (remarks of Senator Long) (emphasis added);
see also 114 CONG. REc. 12297 (1968) (remarks of Senator Fong).
144. 115 CONG. REc. 23240 (1969). In United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523
(S.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920
(1974), the district court, while upholding the showing of necessity, also expressed criti-
cism of the lack of completeness of the affidavit. "Mhe Goverment might have been
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In one recent case in the district court for Northern District of Cali-
fornia,14 i an F.B.I. agent, testifying at an evidentiary hearing on the
necessity issue, admitted to the use of boilerplate language to fulfill the
showing of necessity:
Q. Did the [Department of Justice] Strike Force attorneys assist
you in the drafting of your Affidavit ...?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes? Okay. How did they assist you in preparing these
documents?
A. They assisted me in preparing it by furnishing me what you
refer to in legal -terms as boiler plate or whatever it is .... 146
Q. Is that your format in that Affidavit?
A. That is my -format, yes sir.
Q. The language in those Affidavits is 100 percent your language,
you didn't have any assistance in drafting it?
A. Essentially, the language is 100 percent mine. Like I say, the
[Strike Force Attorneys] may have reviewed it and changed a
word here and -there to make it read like a legal document
should read.14"
A. [Certain boiler plate information was utilized in preparing
these Affidavits. . . . [I]t's a case of where you are trying to
get -the job done as quick [sic] as you can get the job done. If
the wording fits the occasion as far as the general context, it's
easier -to tell a stenographer to . . . copy from a certain
• .. line to a certain ... line from another document, and
if the wording fits, that happens on occasion. That could have
happened here. I don't recall.
Q. And can you recall ...how many times this boiler plate
technique that you've mentioned has been used in obtaining
Title III applications in this District?
A. I can't recall, sir.
Q. What do you mean ...when you said boiler plate?
A. Well, this is the terminology that I've heard mentioned by at-
torneys where the wording predicating some statements or
something of this nature is general-general wording is utilized.
well-advised to include a more detailed summary as to the inadequacy of other investiga-
tive techniques." 335 F. Supp. at 535.
145. United States v. Spagnuolo, Criminal No. 73-0342 AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed July
13, 1972).
146. Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 426, United States v. Spagnu-
olo, Criminal No. 73-0342 AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed July 13, 1972).
147. Id. at 427.
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Q. And in particular in preparing your Affidavit that's in issue in
this particular proceeding . . . do you recall any conversa-
tions with any . . . Strike Force attorneys where they sug-
gested or told you to use any boiler plate language?
A. I don't recall. It could have been-it could have been. I
don't recall.
148
From the F.B.I. agent's testimony, contradictory as it is, it can be
seen that interception application affidavits do indeed contain boiler-
plate allegations used in every case in which they fit the general con-
text. But even when such affidavits do contain factual allegations
related to the actual case involved, these affidavits still fail to show any
proof that all types of normal procedures appear to be inadequate or
unsuccessful. The fact that some normal procedures have been
unsuccessful or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed or to be
too dangerous is not sufficient to show that all types of normal investi-
gative procedures would be unsuccessful.
VI. The Availability of Normal Investigative Techniques
The Senate Report on Title I recognizes that normal investiga-
tive techniques include, but are not limited to, standard aural and visual
surveillance, general questioning or interrogation under an immunity
grant, use of regular search warrants, and infiltration of conspiratorial
groups by undercover agents or informants. 149 Necessity, however,
may be shown without actually attempting any of these techniques-
either by showing they reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried
or would be too dangerous. 1 0
Some courts have construed the necessity requirement to mean
that all possible normal techniques need not be exhausted and that
electronic surveillance need not be used only as a last resort.'' But
the necessity requirement, by its very language, does demand the
exhaustion of all normal techniques-either by actual attempted use of
such techniques or by showing that such techniques reasonably appear
unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous to attempt. The Supreme
148. Id. at 548-50.
149. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 101.
150. Id.
151. United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 73-1510); United States v. Falcone,
364 F. Supp. 877, 889 (D.NJ. 1973), afj'd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Bleau, 363 F. Supp. 438, 441 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp.
852, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 30 (M.D. Fla.
1973); United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 414 (D. Md. 1972); United States
v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); see United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 774
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
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Court, in United States v. Kahn,15 2 accorded some recognition to this
point. The Court found that the necessity requirement is "designed
to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where
traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the
crime."'58  Berger also requires that electronic surveillance be used
only as a last resort, for, as discussed above, the reference to exigent
circumstances in Berger is most persuasively interpreted as a reference
to the concept embodied in the necessity requirement. Senator
McClellan has also referred to the necessity requirement as "a require-
ment designed to make the use of these techniques [electronic surveil-
lance] a tool of last resort."' 54 The Department of Justice manual on
the use of electronic surveillance under Title HI, in describing the
necessity requirement, also states that "interception under Title HI is
to be considered an investigative tool of last resort. . ."I" Thus,
unless the showing of necessity is predicated on the use of normal pro-
cedures being too dangerous, the use of electronic surveillance under
Tifle II should be used only as a last resort, permitted only after it
has been shown that normal procedures have failed or appear unlikely
to succeed or to be too dangerous.
A. Informants
The use of informants has been an invaluable law enforcement
tool for obtaining information and, in some cases, testimony at
trial. But the Senate Report makes repeated reference to the inade-
quacy of the use of informants in organized crime cases, due mainly
to the violent nature of organized crime, the unreliability of informants,
the need to maintain the confidentiality of the informant, and the
insulated position of the top members of the criminal hierarchy..'
5
The report, though, did recognize that there were exceptions to this
situation:
All of this is not to say that significant cases have not been
developed by law enforcement agents using conventional tech-
niques and based upon the testimony of brave martyr-witnesses. 57
152. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
153. Id. at 153 n.12.
154. 115 CONG. Rnc. 23240 (1969). Later in this speech Senator McClellan re-
ferred to the necessity requirement as requiring the exhaustion of normal investigative
techniques. Id.
155. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF ELECRONIC SURVEILLANCE
18 (1969). This manual became public information under the Freedom of Information
Act in Hogan v. United States, Civil No. 73-1385 WM (S.D. Fla., filed Jan. 25, 1974).
156. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-74; Id. at 186 (individual view of Senator
Bayh); Id. at 214-15 (individual view of Senator Scott); Id. at 235-36 (individual views
of Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond). E.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 62, at 35, 71-74.
157. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
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Informants are extensively used to gather information upon which
interception applications are based."5 Since the use of informants is
a normal investigative technique, the inadequacy of this technique
should be shown to meet the requirement of necessity. But no court
has held that the availability of informants precludes a finding of neces-
sity from being made, thereby requiring a denial of an interception ap-
plication or suppression of its fruits. Four main justifications have been
articulated for this result-the refusal of informants to testify,"' con-
cern over guarding the confidentiality of the informant to insure his
safety and continued effectiveness, 160 the inability of informants to
determine the full scope of the alleged conspiracy,"" and that necessity
can be shown simply by the type of crime allegedly involved. 0
These justifications ignore the potential effectiveness of the use
of informants, especially when combined with the use of other conven-
tional techniques. That informants can provide extensive, detailed
information is evident from the fact that great reliance is placed upon
information they obtain in establishing probable cause for the issuance
of regular search warrants and interception orders.0 3  Informants can
158. E.g., United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bynum, remanded, 475 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir.), 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.),
a'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Fan-
tuzzi, 463 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 119 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972); United States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp. 1029,
1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afj'd, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), af 'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
159. See note 137 supra. To find the requirement of necessity as being met by the
refusal of the informant to testify is in essence to allow the government to make the
determination as to whether electronic surveillance will be used, for the government will
thereby be inclined to discourage the already reluctant informer from testifying.
160. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 236 (individual views of Senators Dirksen,
Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond).
161. United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 73-1510); United States v. Lanza,
356 F. Supp. 27, 30 (M.D. Fla. 1973); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 62, at 71-74; see
United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 74-974); United States v. James, 494 F.2d
1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Carubia, 377 F. Supp. 1099, 1103
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp. 852, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929, 933 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Mai-
nello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 874 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp.
405, 419 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (D. Md.)
affd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), afI'd, 416 U.S.
505 (1974); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 535 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modified,
478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974). United States v. Es-
candar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 303 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United States V.
Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
162. See notes 97-100 supra.
163. There is a potential conflict between the use of informants to establish prob-
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provide information on the identity of the individuals involved in the
alleged criminal operations, the purpose and location of meetings or
illegal transactions, and the hierarchy of the organization. They can
continue to advance their position in the organization while simultan-
eously providing a continuous flow of increasingly valuable information
to law enforcement officials. Information obtained from informants or
evidence obtained by them and turned over to law enforcement offi-
cials--such as samples of drugs, betting slips, photographing of cash
used in illegal transactions, and consensually recorded conversations-
can provide the basis for the obtaining of regular search warrants.
Additionally, informants may be used to help introduce undercover
agents into the criminal operation, or set up meetings, sales, purchases,
or other illegal transactions and be accompanied by an undercover
agent at the consummation of the transaction, or even enable the trans-
action to be directly consummated by the agent.
This effectiveness of the use of informants has been implicitly
recognized by the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas' and Spinelli
v. United States, 65 where the Court attempted to establish some guide-
lines for the use of information obtained from informants in search war-
rant affidavits. When read together, these two cases require the search
warrant affidavit to recite sufficient facts about the reliability of the
informant and of the manner in which the informant's information was
obtained to allow the magistrate to make an independant and informed
decision on the issue of probable cause. To show the reliability of the
informant, the affiant invariably states that the informant has been reli-
able in the past by providing information on past occasions that have
lead to convictions. Therefore, when information from informants is
used in interception application affidavits, the affiant is placed in the
position of having to show the effectiveness of the informant in the past
to establish the informant's reliability while simultaneously alleging the
inadequacy of the use of informants to establish the necessity for resort-
ing to the use of electronic surveillance. This inconsistency has gone
unnoticed by the courts.
Perhaps the most effective use to which informants may be put,
and one completely ignored by the courts when deciding the issue of
necessity, is the consensual monitoring or recording of telephone con-
versations between informants and members of the alleged criminal
operation, consensual "bugging" of informants' residences or other
able cause for an interception order and the necessity requirement. The more detailed
and complete the informant's information, the more it may undercut the necessity aver-
ment that the use of informants, or other normal investigative techniques, reasonably
appears unlikely to succeed or otherwise be inadequate.
164. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
165. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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premises, arid the equipping of informants with recorders or transmit-
ters. Consensual interceptions are not governed by Title II; 66 there-
fore such interceptions are normal investigative techniques that, to meet
the necessity requirement showing, must be shown to be unlikely to
succeed or to be too dangerous to attempt.
The same sort of evidence that can be obtained from Title rnI
interceptions may also be developed through the use of such consensual
interceptions. Informants can make telephone calls arranging illegal
transactions or sales with members of the illegal operation and consent
to the monitoring and recording of such conversations. Evidence
obtained from such calls or conversations may be invaluable in provid-
ing probable cause to make arrests, in obtaining search warrants, and
in developing leads that may be further investigated to obtain additional
information. The higher up the informant is in the criminal hierarchy
the more valuable this evidence-gathering tool may be. But even when
this technique has actually been used prior to the application for an
interception order, and such conversations have been consensually
monitored and recorded, research has discovered no court that has
found that the availability of this technique precluded a finding of
necessity.
167
There is one major problem, though, with the use of consensual
interceptions. There has been, and continues to be, a strong judicial
and law enforcement policy of protecting the confidentiality of the
identity of informants unless the informant may have evidence material
to the guilt or innocence of the accused. 68 The problem develops due
to the fact that, in making any overt use of the consensually intercepted
conversations, law enforcement officials may either directly or indirectly
disclose the identity of informants. In researching this note no case
has been found 'that has required disclosure of the identity of inform-
ants on the issue of necessity, so law enforcement officials, to protect
the identity of informants, would not want to make any use of
consensual interceptions that would jeopardize this confidentiality.
Since there are so many possible ways in which the availability of
informants may be exploited as an investigative tool, courts should
require what Title III explicitly demands-a "full and complete state-
ment" as to why the use of informants is or will be inadequate. The
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)&(d) (1968).
167. See United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972); United
States v. Staino, 358 F. Supp. 852, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Focarile, 340
F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (D. Md.), affd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522
(4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
168. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53 (1957).
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force of this proposition seems especially strong when other investiga-
tive procedures are also available and could be used in combination
with information received from informants. Continued judicial defer-
ence to conclusory boilerplate statements in interception affidavits that
the use of informants is or would be inadequate seems directly contrary
to the letter and spirit of the necessity requirement.
To aid in a careful and complete examination of these issues when
allegations are made that there was an inadequate showing of necessity,
courts should require at least an in camera examination of informants
so as to be able to fully discover firsthand the position and capabilities
of the informants. This in camera examination should be done prior
to the authorization of interceptions under Title fII, and before any
ruling on any suppression motion based on a contention that the neces-
sity requirement has not been met because the use of informants would
have been an adequate investigative technique-either by itself or in
conjunction with the use of other conventional techniques.
B. Undercover Agents
Undercover agents have been successfully used in many cases
where electronic surveillance has been used, both before and after the
issuance of the interception order.'- 9 There are many advantages to
the use of undercover agents relative to the use of informants. Protec-
tion of the confidentiality of the identity of the agent is not a major
concern, nor are there problems of reliability of information received
firsthand by an agent, of the agent's credibility as a witness at trial, or
with consensual interception of conversations when the agent is a party
to the conversation. Undercover agents may also be used to infiltrate
criminal organizations and thereby obtain incriminating evidence and
information on a continuing basis. With such evidence and information
search warrants may be obtained or other conventional investigative
techniques used to pursue leads developed by the agent.
Courts have paid little attention to the fact that undercover agents
have been successfully used prior to the application for an interception
order, or the apparent prospect of their continued use after the inter-
ception order has been obtained. For example, in United States v.
169. E.g., United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974);
United States v. Herrmann, 371 F. Supp. 343, 347 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v.
Staino, 358 F. Supp. 852, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp.
405, 415 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (D.
Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), af'd,
416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 536 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
modified, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United
States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 241 (D.D.C. 1971).
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James,17° discussed above, an informant was used to set up two
narcotics sales made to an undercover agent by the alleged head of the
narcotics operation-the man who was the main target of the investiga-
tion and who was later named as the subject of an interception order.
The informant also permitted the consensual monitoring and recording
of his telephone conversations and the "bugging" of his apartment.
The finding of necessity for the interception order was based on the
need to expose the entire operation and the improbable prospects of
successful penetration of the operation by the informant due to the
extreme caution of the target of the investigation. No mention of the
use of consensual interceptions or of undercover agents was made, nor
were the potentialities of success of such procedures evaluated. Thus,
even when illegal transactions with the key figures of an illegal opera-
tion are consummated in the presence of an undercover agent, the
necessity requirement still has been found to have been met, even
though other normal investigative techniques were also apparently
available to be used.' 7 '
The use of undercover agents provides many different potential
avenues by which to obtain incriminating information and evidence.
Especially when combined with the use of other conventional tech-
niques, this technique may provide a means of obtaining information
and evidence on the scope, extent, and hierarchy of the suspected ie-
gal operations. An interception application affidavit should provide a
detailed and complete explanation as to why the use of undercover
agents would be inadequate.
C. Regular Search Warrants
Regular search warrants may be used to search for and seize con-
traband, fruits and instrumentalities of the alleged crime, or now even
mere evidence of the alleged crime.Y12  Search warrants have been,
and will continue to be, an effective law enforcement tool of great evi-
dentiary value. Any number of normal investigative techniques may
be used to gather the information necessary to establish the probable
cause required to obtain a search warrant.
But courts have found that the availability of this traditional pro-
cedure, even when probable cause to search exists, does not preclude
a finding of necessity. This has been done by finding that in certain
types or classes of crimes, the use of search warrants is inadequate-
not because of the facts of the specific case, but because of the nature
of the alleged crime. Courts, relying uncritically upon conclusory
170. 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
171. S'ee note 169 supra.
172. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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boilerplate terms, have found that search warrants are inadequate in
gambling cases since the use of such warrants fail to produce evidence
on all the elements of the offense, and any records kept by the opera-
tion can easily be destroyed. 17  This type of reliance upon conclusory
boilerplate terms is also found in narcotics cases where "raids are tra-
ditionally unsuccessful in gathering evidence of importation and distri-
bution of narcotics,"'174 and narcotics dealers "rarely keep records, deal
personally with a few trusted individuals [and] receive, store, and
deliver narcotics at varying locations in order to avoid detection."'' 75
Great reliance is also placed upon the law of conspiracy in making in-
terception applications, where a standard boilerplate term is that normal
investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed in determining the full
extent of the conspiracy, the identity of all its members, and the
hierarchy of the organization.' 76
None of these boilerplate terms used in the interception applica-
tion affidavits are based upon a consideration of the specific facts of
the actual case in which the interception application is being made.
Rather they are based only upon the opinion and general experience
of the affiants or that of other agents. To accept an affiant's conclu-
sions, without requiring a statement of the facts relied upon by the
affiant in determining that the use of search warrants will be inade-
quate, is to ignore the requirement of a "full and complete statement"
of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case leading to the
conclusion that the use of normal investigative procedures will be
inadequate.
D. Visual Surveillance
Visual surveillance is a standard law enforcement technique that
is used in virtually every investigation. Though visual surveillance by
itself is not usually a complete investigative tool, when it is combined
with other normal investigative techniques it can be very effective.
Visual surveillance of the locus of suspected illegal activities and of the
people and materials entering and leaving the location may provide
173. United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 983 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied
sub. norm. Gray v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 73-
231); United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948
(1972); United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 414 (D. Md. 1972); United States
v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Whitaker, 343
F. Supp. 358, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 953 (1973).
174. United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 303 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded
sub norn. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
175. See note 142 supra.
176. This averment was found in every interception application examined.
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probable cause to obtain search warrants that may be executed while
incriminating evidence is suspected of being on the surveilled persons
or premises. Visual surveillance may be made of meetings and
suspected illegal sales or other transactions, and may be filmed to pre-
serve the evidentiary value of such surveillance. Follow-up investiga-
tions may then be made of the people present at such meetings or trans-
actions, and of other leads developed through visual surveillance.
Through such ever-widening investigations, combined with whatever
other conventional investigative techniques that are available, the
scope, extent, and hierarchy of the suspected illegal operations may
possibly be discovered without resorting to the use of electronic surveil-
lance.
E. Pen Registers
The use of pen registers177 is not governed by the procedures
established in Title 1]I178 Therefore, they also are to be considered
a normal investigative procedure. But courts have failed to recognize
this fact, for in many cases the order permitting the use of pen registers
is obtained at the same time as the Title I interception order.Y9  In
177. A pen register is a device attached to a given telephone line, usually at a cen-
tral telephone office. A pulsation of the dial on the line to which the pen register is
attached records dashes on a paper tape equal in number to the number dialed. The
paper tape then becomes a permanent and complete record of outgoing numbers called
on the particular line. With reference to incoming calls, the pen register records only
a dash for each ring of the telephone but does not identify the number from which the
incoming call originated. The pen register cuts off after the number is dialed on the
outgoing calls and after the ringing is concluded on incoming calls without determining
whether the call is completed or the receiver answered. There is neither recording nor
monitoring of the conversation with a pen register. The mechanical complexities of the
pen register are more fully explained in United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033,
1038-41 (D. Md.), af'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir.
1972), a!f'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). The above explanation also applies to touch tone
decoders, which are simply the device used on modem touch tone telephones.
178. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 548-53 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 421-22 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United
States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1038-39 (D. Md.), affd sub nom. United States
v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), affd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States
v. Vega, 52 F.R.D. 503, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523,
549 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
920 (1974); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 303-04 (S.D. Fla. 1970), re-
manded sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam); SENAmT REPORT, supra note 2, at 90.
But pen registers, like electronic surveillance, would not be successful unless pre-
search notice is withheld. Therefore, the considerations of Berfer v. New York may
be relevant, especially the exigent circumstances requirement. No court has yet rec-
ognized this potential problem.
179. United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223-24 (8th Cir. 1974); United States
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such instances there has been no discussion devoted to an explanation
of why the use of pen registers could not have been attempted prior
to the application for an interception order. In a few cases authoriza-
tion for the use of a pen register has been applied for, authorized, and
used prior to the application for an interception order.18 0 This seems
at least an implicit recognition of the potentiality of success possible
with the use of pen registers.
The use of a pen register, coupled with an examination of long
distance toll records, will give law enforcement officers a complete
record of all outgoing local and long distance calls made from the tele-
phone to which the pen register is attached. From this information
expanded investigation of the location of the telephones to which out-
going calls were made, and of the persons associated with the premises,
may in turn provide information about the extent, scope, and hierarchy
of the suspected illegal operation. As the Senate Report empha-
sized,"81 and the congressional findings on Title ImI explicitly state,'
the telephone remains an essential vehicle for communication in
organized crime operations. The use of pen registers, especially when
combined with other conventional techniques, can be an effective tool
to exploit this dependence on telephones without accomplishing the
greater invasion of privacy entailed by the use of electronic surveil-
lance. Unfortunately, none of the affidavits examined made any men-
tion of the prior use of pen registers or why an attempt to use them
would be unsuccessful.
F. Immunity Grants
Though the use of general questioning and interrogation under an
immunity grant is recognized in the Senate Report as a normal investi-
gative technique,'8 3 there has been only infrequent discussion of the
v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 192 n.2 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); United
States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Boone, 348 F.
Supp. 168, 169 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, 499 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 421 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp.
523, 548 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D. Del. 1971); United
States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United
States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
180. United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 889 (D.N.J. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d
478 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (D. Md.), affd
sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505
(1974).
181. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 71-74, 89, 236 (individual views of Senators
Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond).
182. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, § 801(c), 82
Stat. 212.
183. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 101.
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availability or inadequacy of this technique in cases involving Title II
interception authorizations,' 8 4 and no mention of it in any of the inter-
ception application affidavits examined. Perhaps this is partly due to
the Senate Report's repeated reference to the code of silence of
organized crime, enforced by actual or threatened violence, as neces-
sitating the resort to the use of electronic surveilance.'-' In any event,
immunity grants are a widely used and potent law enforcement tool.
An articulation of the reasons for the inadequacy of its use should be
included in the interception application affidavit in order to comply with
the requirement of a "full and complete statement" of the inadequacy
of conventional investigative techniques.
VII. Conclusion
The necessity requirement is a key provision of Title III designed
to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications and a constitu-
tional requirement prescribed by Berger v. New York. However, Title
III provides no guidelines for its interpretation. As a result, the
requirement has been interpreted so broadly that it has become no
requirement at all. Law enforcement officials use boilerplate terms in
their interception application affidavits to meet the requirement. But
these terms fail to provide the "full and complete statement" as to the
inadequacy of normal investigative techniques required by Title III.
The affidavits do not describe all of the normal investigative techniques
used or that are available to be used, and why the use of such tech-
niques would be inadequate, nor have courts required this degree of
completeness. In fact, the affidavits do not even meet the standards
established in the Department of Justice's manual on the use of elec-
tronic surveillance under Title II:
Each request for authorization should contain . . . [a] complete
description of the investigation being conducted-its origin, devel-
opment, and present status. This description must include a
detailed analysis of all investigative procedures utilized and con-
sidered and a statement as to the reasons for their inadequacy.186
184. The only case found in researching this note that contained any discussion as
to the inadequacy of the use of immunity grants was United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp.
1357, 1362-63 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
185. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 72; id. at 186 (individual view of Senator
Bayh), id. at 236 (individual views of Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond).
186. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF ELTRoNic SURVEILLANcE
8 (1969). 'The most troublesome requirement is that of Section 2518(1)(c), which
calls for a detailed statement of the other investigative procedures used or rejected." Id.
at 17. But the manual contradicts itself later: "In the event that it does become neces-
sary to divulge [to the judge] the exact nature of all the investigative procedures used,
any confidential information can be safeguarded [by sealing the application and order]:'
Id. at 18.
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To meet the necessity requirement courts should require a
detailed statement describing the normal investigative techniques used
or available to be used and an explanation of why the use of such tech-
niques was rejected as inadequate. This statement should be based
upon a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the specific case
in which the interception application is being made and not merely
based on a conclusory boilerplate statement based on the affiant's
general experience or that of other law enforcement agents, as is the
present practice.
The necessity requirement should not be a mere paper provision,
but instead strictly construed, applied, and observed in order to
accomplish the purposes for which it was intended. To do this, courts
will have to begin to more closely scrutinize the necessity showing and
demand a detailed and complete explanation of why normal investiga-
tive procedures have been tried and failed, or reasonably appear
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. Statutory amend-
ments to Title IM are also needed to set guidelines for the interpretation
of the necessity requirement and to insure that courts are carefully and
closely examining the necessity allegations in the interception applica-
tion affidavits. The latter can be accomplished by requiring a detailed
written finding on the basis for the authorizing court's determination
of necessity to be filed by the judge along with the interception order.
To so construe the necessity requirement will perhaps make it
more difficult to obtain authorizations for the use of electronic surveil-
lance under Title III. But it will also help protect the privacy interests
of all citizens, for electronic surveillance is not a discriminating investi-
gative tool; it permits the interception of innocent conversations of the
law-abiding as well as the incriminating conversations made by the
criminal.
[R]estrictions upon means of law enforcement handicap society's
capacity to deal with two of its most deeply disturbing problems:
the fact and fear of crime. . . . [But -the] "history of liberty
has largely been -the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards." And the history of the destruction of liberty . . . has
largely been the history of the relaxation of those safeguards in the
face of plausible-sounding governmental claims of a need to deal
with widely frightening and emotion-freighted threats to the good
order of society.187
187. Amsterdam, Perspectives on The Fourth Amendment, 58 MniN. L. REv. 349,
354 (1974) (footnote omitted). "The necessity for strict compliance with the statute
in a wiretap situation stems just as much from the precedent-setting example of condon-
ing laxity which could lead to further laxity in years to come, with serious consequences
to personal liberties, as from concern over the rights of the accused in a given case."
United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522, 530 (4th Cir. 1972), affd, 416 U.S. 505
(1974), quoting from United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1115 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
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ADDENDUM
Since the writing of this note a recent case, United States v. Kerri-
gan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1975), has found some merit in the de-
fendant's contention that the necessity showing made was insufficient
although upholding the authorizing judge's finding of necessity. Recog-
nizing the fact that law enforcement agencies use boilerplate allegations
to meet the necessity requirement, the court expressed criticism of this
practice and found the showing sufficient only because of the strong
factual context of the case. After summarizing the allegations of the
affidavit, the court stated:
We agree with appellants that the boilerplate recitation of the
difficulties of gathering usable evidence in bookmaking prosecutions
is not a sufficient basis for granting a wiretap order. To hold other-
wise would make § 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c) mere formalities in
bookmaking cases. However, in this case, agents had engaged in
investigation for over three months, including physical surveillance
of the suspects, had reasonably established that their informants
would not testify, and had reason to believe that the other evidence
thus far produced would not support a conviction. Further, phys-
ical surveillance of the residence identified by informants as hous-
ing the four "front office" telephones disclosed that it was fronted
by a 5-foot high chain link fence topped by 3-stranded barb wire
and had two large dogs patrolling the area between house and fence.
Thus the government demonstrated a factual basis for its concern
that the suspects might have time and inclination to destroy evi-
dence in case of search.
While this Court gives little weight to conclusionary state-
ments about the outcome of future investigations, we also recognize
that the law does not require that a wiretap be used only as a last
resort. On balance we find that the affidavit, while marginal, does
suffice to meet the requirement of 2518(1) (c). United States v.
Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35, 38 (9th Cir. 1975).
Hopefully the Kerrigan case, briefly touching many issues raised
in this note, portends a closer judicial scrutiny of the necessity require-
ment and the allegations of application affidavits designed to meet the
requirement.
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